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JAMES R BROWN

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1961

No. 505

A. L. WIRIN,

Petitioner,

vs.

HAROLD J. OSTLY, as County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of the State of California (Second Appellate District, Division Two).

A. L. WIRIN,
257 South Spring Street,
Los Angeles 12, California,
In Pro. Per.

FRED OKRAND,

SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE

Opinions below 2

Grounds on which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked 2

Question presented for review 3

Constitutional provisions and statute involved 3

Statement of the case 6

Facts 6

How the federal question was raised 8

A. In the trial court 8

B. In the court below 9

Reasons for granting the writ and argument amplifying same .. 10

I.

Hearing should be granted so as to settle the important federal question, left unsettled between Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, as to how far, if at all, the states may go in imposing a burden of proof to establish non-advocacy upon an applicant for a position 10

II.

The decision of the court below was decided in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court .. 12

Conclusion 16

Appendix A. Opinion of the District Court of Appeal ..... App. p. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES	PAGE
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485	12
American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382	12
Anastaplo, In re, 336 U. S. 82	12
Bank of Woodland v. Oberhaus, 125 Cal. 320	15
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516	12
Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399	12
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, No. 72, Oct. Term, 1961	12, 13
First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U. S. 545	12
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716	12
Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61	12
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391	14
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U. S. 36	10, 11, 12
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468	12
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449	12
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U. S. 1	12
Osman v. Douds, 339 U. S. 846	12
Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165	2
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479	12, 14, 15
Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505	11
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551	12
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513	10, 11, 12, 16
Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60	12

PAGE

Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 15

United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting of 47 Bottles, etc., 26 F. R. D. 4 14

United States v. Miranti, 253 F. 2d 135 14

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 12

RULES

California District Court of Appeal, Rules on Appeal, Rule 28 2

California District Court of Appeal, Rules on Appeal, Rule 29 2

California Supreme Court Rules on Appeal, Rule 28 2

California Supreme Court Rules on Appeal, Rule 29 2

Rules of United States Supreme Court, Rule 22(3) 3

STATUTES

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2015.5 15

California Consitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4 2

California Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4(c) 2

California Constitution, Art. XX, Sec. 3 ..... 1, 3, 4, 6, 7

California Governmental Code, Sec. 8301 6

California Government Code, Sec. 8205 15

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1257(3) 3

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 2101(c) 3

United States Constitution, First Amendment 1, 3, 12

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 1, 3, 10

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Sec. 1 3

TEXTBOOKS

29 United States Law Week, p. 3358 13

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1961

No. .....

A. L. Wirin,

Petitioner,

vs.

Harold J. Ostly, as County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of the State of California (Second Appellate District, Division Two).

Petitioner, A. L. Wirin, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the District Court of Appeal of the State of California adjudging that the non-disloyalty oath of Article XX, Section 3 of the California Constitution, as applied to petitioner, an applicant for the position of Notary Public, is constitutional and not violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Opinions Below.

The trial court rendered no written opinion.

The opinion of the court below [R. .....][1] is reported at 191 A. C. A. 746, 13 Cal. Rptr. 31. It is appended hereto as Appendix "A".

The judgment of the court below, in accordance with its practice, is the last phrase of its opinion [R. .....: Appx. A, p. 5].

". . . judgment is affirmed."

Grounds on Which the Jurisdiction of This Court Is Invoked.

1. The date of the judgment sought to be reviewed and the time of its entry is May 2, 1961 [R. ....: Appx. A, p. 1].

2. No rehearing was requested in the court below. Timely filed petition for hearing in the California Supreme Court was denied without opinion on June 21, 1961 [R. .....]. Under California procedure, the District Court of Appeal is, therefore, the highest state court in which a decision in this case could be had (*Rochin v. California*, 342 U. S. 165, 167; Cal. Const. Art. VI, §§4, 4(c); Rules 28 and 29, Rules on Appeal for the Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal of the State of California [36 Cal. 2d 24-25]). Time for filing petition for writ of certiorari was extended on September 11, 1961 by Mr. Chief Justice Warren to and including October 19, 1961.

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[1]The record being certified to this Court consists of the Clerk's Transcript of the proceedings in the trial court [C. T.], the Reporter's Transcript in the Trial Court [R. T.], the Opinion (including the Judgment) of the Court below and the Order of the California Supreme Court denying hearing.

3. The statutory provisions believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment in question by writ of certiorari are 28 U. S. C. 1257(3) and 2101(c) and Rule 22(3) of this Court.

Question Presented for Review.

Is the non-disloyalty oath requirement of California Constitution Article XX, Section 3 unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as violative of the guarantees of freedom of speech, conscience, religion and thought and of the right of privacy of opinion, as applied to an otherwise qualified applicant for the office of notary public who refuses to take the oath as a condition of being a notary public?

Constitutional Provisions and Statute Involved.

First Amendment to the United States Constitution:

> "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

> "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Article XX, Section 3 of the California Constitution:

"Members of the Legislature, and all public officers and employees, executive, legislative, and judicial, except such inferior officers and employees as may be by law exempted, shall, before they enter upon the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:

"'I, . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm)that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.

"'And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means; that within the five years immediately preceding the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of any party or organization, political or other-

wise, that advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means except as follows:

.....

"(If no affiliations, write in the words 'No Exceptions')
and that during such time as I hold the office of (name of office)
..... I will not advocate nor become a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means.'

"And no other oath, declaration, or test, shall be required as a qualification for any public office or employment.

" 'Public officer and employee' includes every officer and employee of the State, including the University of California, every county, city, city and county, district, and authority, including any department, division, bureau, board, commission, agency, or instrumentality of any of the foregoing."

Statement of the Case.

Facts.

Petitioner possesses all the qualifications for being a notary public in California [C. T. 32].[2] Pursuant to his application and payment of the required fee, petitioner was appointed and commissioned a notary public of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles by the Governor of the State [C. T. 32-33]. At the same time that the Secretary of State of California forwarded to petitioner the commission, he also forwarded to petitioner an oath, in the form of Article XX, §3 of the California Constitution, to be taken before the respondent County Clerk of Los Angeles County [C. T. 33]. Thereupon petitioner presented to respondent his notary bond in the amount and form required by law together with the required fee for the recording of the bond [C. T. 33]. Petitioner was and is ready and willing to take the oath of allegiance portion of the oath [C. T. 34-35][3] but refused, as a con-

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[2]Under Section 8301 of the California Government Code, the qualifications for being a notary public are: (1) Citizenship of the United States and of California, (2) Age of at least 21 years, (3) residence, principal place of business or employment in the County for at least 12 months, (4) good moral character.

[3]I, ... , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter."

dition to his being permitted to perform the duties of a notary public, to take the non-disloyalty portion of the oath [C. T. 33-34].[4]

Respondent refused to permit petitioner to take the oath other than in the complete form set out in Article XX, §3 of the California Constitution [C. T. 35]. Without the oath and bond being filed with the County Clerk, it is a misdeameanor to exercise the functions of notary public [C. T. 14].

This suit was thereupon brought for a declaration that the non-disloyalty portion of the oath are, as applied to petitioner, unconstitutional and for a declaration that petitioner is entitled to qualify as a notary public upon his taking the remaining, or oath of allegiance, portion of the oath [C. T. 10].

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[4] "And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means; that within the five years immediately preceding the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means except as follows:

.....

(If no affiliations, write in the words 'No Exception')

and that during such time as I hold the office of .....

..... I will not advocate nor

(name of office)

become a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means."

This oath of disclaimer is commonly known in California as the Levering Oath [C. T. 9, 1].

The trial court held the oath to be valid and gave judgment to respondent [C. T. 39]. The court below affirmed [R. .....; Appx. A, p. 5].

There is no dispute as to the facts heretofore set forth. The sole factual issue at the trial was whether petitioner was unable to take the disputed oath as a matter of personal conscience and religious belief [R. T. 2; C. T. 8-9]. Because, in response to questions put to him by the trial judge for the purpose of testing weight and credibility [R. T. 14, 15], petitioner did answer in court questions covering some of the matters called for in the Levering Oath, the trial court found [C. T. 31] that it was not true that petitioner was unable or unwilling because of personal conscience or religious belief or because of his membership in the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles to take the Levering Oath, the court adding a factor not present in the case: "under any and all circumstances." [C. T. 35]. In explaining his finding on this point, the court said [R. T. 22]: "I cannot draw a distinction between testifying orally in open court and filing the same thing in written form with the County Clerk."

How the Federal Question Was Raised.

A. In the Trial Court.

In his complaint, petitioner alleged [C. T. 9]:

> "The requirement by the defendants of the plaintiff that he subscribe to said Levering Oath, as a condition prior to the certification aforesaid by said defendant Ostly, and as a condition prior to the plaintiff's exercising any of the functions of a notary public, is beyond the authority of the de-

fendants and each of them, in that said Article XX, Section 3 of the California Constitution is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff in the following respects and particulars:

"It abridges freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, and the plaintiff's right of privacy of opinion, without due process of law, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."

The trial court ruled against this contention and held the oath to be valid and constitutional [C. T. 36].

B. In the Court Below.

In his briefs in the court below, petitioner argued the same issue, the court below putting the question before it this way [R. .....; Appx. A, p. 3]:

"The issue here presented to this court is whether the respondent county clerk may require a candidate for the office of notary public to take the oath prescribed in Article XX, Section 3 of the Constitution of this State, or whether said oath unconstitutionally abridges freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, the right of privacy of opinion, without due process, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."

By its affirmance [R. .....; Appx. A, p. 5], the court ruled the oath not unconstitutional.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT AND ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING SAME.

I.

Hearing Should Be Granted so as to Settle the Important Federal Question, Left Unsettled Between Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, as to How Far, if at All, the States May Go in Imposing a Burden of Proof to Establish Non-Advocacy Upon an Applicant for a Position.

In *Speiser v. Randall*, 357 U. S. 513, this Court held unconstitutional, as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state requirement of a non-advocacy oath[5] as a condition of obtaining tax exemption.

In *Konigsberg v. State Bar of California*, 366 U. S. 36, this Court held not violative of due process a state requirement that an applicant for the bar answer questions as to membership in the Communist Party. The Court, over a vigorous dissent which thought that the requirement in *Konigsberg* did, indeed, violate *Speiser*, held that *Speiser* was not applicable because in *Konigsberg* it did not appear that the applicant was being required to carry the burden of persuasion on the issue of advocacy of violent overthrow but only that the petitioner had failed to answer relevant questions.

In the case at bar, respondent in answer to petitioner's claim that the instant oath fell within *Speiser*

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[5]That the signer "does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means . . ."

because it placed on him the burden of proving that he did not advocate, has made clear that the applicant has at least some burden of proof. Thus, in oral argument before the court below (p. 11), his counsel said:

> ". . . But there is only one initial burden. It is slight. *It is on the applicant to prove non-advocacy.*" (Italics added.)

And in answer to the Petition for Hearing in the California Supreme Court, respondent stated (p. 9):[6]

> "Here, all that *the State requires* is *that petitioner*, by taking the constitutional oath, *establish* only *a prima facie case of non-advocacy* . . ." (Italics added.)

This, then, poses the question left undecided by *Konigsberg:* Can a State, consistent with due process, require an applicant to establish even a *prima facie* case of non-advocacy? Or does not the requirement of proving a *prima facie* case have all the vices spoken of in *Speiser* and require the applicant to "sustain the burden of proving the negative." (357 U. S. at 526).

To decide this important question, hearing should be granted. Whatever may be the true meaning of *Konigsberg*, this Court should not "go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch." *(Silverman v. United States*, 365 U. S. 505, 512).

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[6] A copy of this document is being lodged with the Clerk of this Court for the convenience of the Court.

II.

The Decision of the Court Below Was Decided in a Way Probably Not in Accord With Applicable Decisions of This Court.

This Term this Court will hear argument in a "loyalty oath" case concerning a school teacher from Florida (*Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida*, No. 72, Oct. Term, 1961).

The grant of hearing by the Court in that case demonstrates, despite cases which have upheld oaths[7] or similar measures for compelled disclosure,[8] that this Court is ever sensitive lest in this delicate field the asserted right of Government to compel disclosure of a citizen's beliefs, advocacies or affiliations rides roughshod over protected First Amendment rights.

Of course the *Cramp* case is not the first demonstration of this Court's concern in the field. Where constitutional bounds have been overstepped, the Court has not hesitated to so declare.[9] The instant case comes within the cases just cited and the decision of the court below is inconsistent with them.

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[7] *E.g. American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U. S. 382; *Osman v. Douds*, 339 U. S. 846; *Garner v. Board of Public Works*, 341 U. S. 716.

[8] *E.g. Adler v. Board of Education*, 342 U. S. 485; *In re Anastaplo*, 336 U. S. 82; *Beilan v. Board of Public Education*, 357 U. S. 399; *Konigsberg v. State Bar of California*, 366 U. S. 36; *Lerner v. Casey*, 357 U. S. 468; *Nelson v. County of Los Angeles*, 362 U. S. 1.

[9] *E.g. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles*, 357 U. S. 545; *Speiser v. Randall*, 357 U. S. 513; *Slochower v. Board of Education*, 350 U. S. 551; *Wieman v. Updegraff*, 344 U. S. 183; *Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U. S. 479. *Cf. Girouard v. United States*, 328 U. S. 61; *Bates v. Little Rock*, 361 U. S. 516; *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama*, 357 U. S. 449; *Talley v. California*, 362 U. S. 60.

The reason which prompted this Court to hear the *Cramp* case are equally present here and for like reasons hearing should be granted. Indeed, the posture of the *Cramp* case would seem to suggest additional reason for granting certiorari here. In *Cramp* this Court postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits (29 U. S. Law Week 3358). There is no jurisdictional problem in the case at bar.

There is both a similarity and a dissimilarity between this case and *Cramp*. In *Cramp*, the appellant affirmatively had alleged in his complaint the non-existence of the matters called for in the Florida oath.[10] Here petitioner had answered questions put to him by the trial judge concerning some of the matters called for in the California oath [R. T. 13, 14]. Because Cramp had so alleged in his complaint, the Florida Supreme Court held that he had no standing to sue (125 So. 2d 554). Because petitioner here had answered in court, the trial judge held [C. T. 35] that petitioner's refusal to take the oath before respondent could not have been based on religious grounds as he had alleged in his complaint [C. T. 8, 9] and to which he testified in court [R. T. 4, 5].[11] The trial court stated that had it thought petitioner's refusal was

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[10]Appellee's brief in *Cramp*, citing page 2 of the Record in that case.

[11]". . . There is there a quotation from the statement made by the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles. Now I will refer to it.

"'The principles, moral and religious, of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles compel it, its members, officers and minister, as a matter of deepest conscience, belief and

based on religious grounds, he might have come to a different conclusion [*R. T. 22*]. The court below did not discuss this phase of the case. Nevertheless there remains in the case the intriguing question as to whether when one answers in court questions concerning which he has refused to answer in another context on religious grounds, the refusal of the latter cannot be said to be religious.[12] We submit that the conclusion does not follow from the premise.[13]

The function which respondent would not permit petitioner to pursue unless he took the complete expurgatory test oath was that of a Notary Public. That the State cannot compel an unconstitutional oath as a condition of performing such function was settled

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conviction, to deny power in the State to compel acceptance by it or any other church of this or any other oath of coerced affirmation as to church doctrine, advocacy or beliefs.'

"I subscribe to and believe in this principle of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles of which I am a member.

"Q. Is it because of your acceptance of this principle that you refused to subscribe to the oath that was presented to you when you applied for a commission as a notary public?

"A. This is one of the reasons; perhaps the principle reason; but I was prompted also by other reasons.

"Q. What are those other reasons?

"A. The other reasons are: That I feel that I am unable as a matter of conscience, matter of personal conscience and as a matter of personal belief to subscribe to that portion of the oath required of me by the County Counsel which has been commonly designated as the Levering Act Oath, which I consider to be a test oath as to non-disloyalty, and this is a matter of personal conscience and personal belief."

[12]*Cf. United States v. Miranti*, 253 F. 2d 135 (C. A. 2, 1958); *United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting of 17 Bottles, etc.*, 26 F. R. D. 4 (D. N.J. 1960); *Grunewald v. United States*, 353 U. S. 391, 421-422.

[13]*Cf. Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U. S. 479 where appellant refused to file the affidavit but testified to the facts called for by it at the trial.

by a unanimous court this last term in *Torcaso v. Watkins*, 367 U. S. 488. So the fact that petitioner is an applicant for that office is no bar. But more pointedly: In California, notaries public have long been considered to be performing but ministerial functions (*Bank of Woodland v. Oberhaus*, 125 Cal. 320, 324 (1899)). And since the passage, in 1957, of Code of Civil Procedure 2015.5,[14] it can fairly be said that notaries public, who never were, nor are, employees of the State nor receive any compensation from it, occupy a minor role as a "public official". There has been no showing by respondent, nor even a contention, that there ever was, or that there is, any danger to the State *from the performance by* those against whom the oath is directed of the functions that a notary may do in California.[15] Therefore, there is "no substantial relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort to compel disclosure" (*Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U. S. 479, 485) nor

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[14]"Whenever, under any law of this State or under any rule, regulation, order or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official *other than a notary public*), such matter may with like force and effect be evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing of such person stating the date and place of execution, and which is subscribed by him and certified or declared by him to be true 'under penalty of perjury,' which certification or declaration may be in substantially the following form:

"I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (Added Stats. 1957, c. 1612 p. 2959, § 1.)" (Italics added.)

[15]The duties of a notary public, as modified as a practical matter by Code of Civil Procedure 2015.5, are set out in California Government Code 8205.

is there "an evil shown to be grave." (*Speiser v. Randall*, 357 U. S. 513, 527). This case is not one "concerned (with) a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety." *(Ibid.)*

Conclusion.

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

A. L. WIRIN,

In Pro. Per.

FRED OKRAND,

Of Counsel.

APPENDIX A.

Opinion of the District Court of Appeal.

In the District Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two.

A. L. Wirin, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. Harold J. Ostly, as County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, et al., Defendants. Harold J. Ostly, as County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, Respondent. Civ. No. 24644.

Filed May 2, 1961.

Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Charles A. Loring, Judge. Affirmed.

For Appellant: A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Abraham Gorenfeld, Richard W. Petherbridge.

Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant: Rudolph Pacht, Albert M. Bendich.

For Respondent: Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel; Ronald L. Schneider, Deputy County Counsel.

The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to hold the office of notary public without subscribing to certain portions of the oath set forth in Article XX, Section 3, of the Constitution of the State of California, and that defendant Harold J. Ostly, as County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, was without legal authority to refuse to administer the oath in the modified form in which plaintiff was willing to take the oath or to refuse to transmit the certificate required by section 8213 of the Government Code. From a judgment for the defendant, this appeal is taken.

Appellant was willing to take that part of the oath which reads as follows:

"I, ..., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter."

The appellant refused to take that portion of the oath which reads as follows:

"And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means; that within the five years immediately preceding the taking of this oath (or affirmation), I have not been a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means except as follows: .....

(if no exceptions

.....and that during

write in the words "No Exceptions")

such time as I hold the office of Notary Public I will not advocate nor become a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocates the

overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means."

The issue here presented to this court is whether the respondent county clerk may require a candidate for the office of notary public to take the oath prescribed in Article XX, Section 3 of the Constitution of this State, or whether said oath unconstitutionally abridges freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, the right of privacy of opinion, without due process, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

At the trial of the action, appellant testified that he could not subscribe to the indicated portions of the oath because of his religious beliefs and the tenets of his church in regard to test oaths. The appellant in court testified that he does not advocate nor is he ". . . a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means . . .". He further testified that within the five years immediately preceding his testimony in court he had not been a member of any party or organization that advocated the overthrow of either of the above governments by force or violence, and further testified that he would not, during his term of office, advocate the overthrow of either government by force or violence.

To support his contentions, appellant cites many authorities, the United States Constitution, decisions of federal courts, the California Constitution, many California statutes, codes and court decisions, several texts,

transcripts of hearings before subcommittees of the Federal Congress and of the California Legislature, and excerpts from magazines and newspapers, including campaign speeches by candidates for the presidency.

Despite this wealth of authorities, it would appear that the constitutionality of the particular oath here questioned was upheld by the Supreme Court of this state in Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676. The only difference we can discern is that in the Pockman case the oath objected to was, at that time, contained in a Government Code section and was in addition to the then provided constitutional oath of office. The fact that this oath has since been adopted into the state constitution would seem in no way to detract from the validity and effect of the holding in the Pockman case.

Certain arguments by appellant to the effect that a notary public is an unimportant type of public officer were answered by the Pockman case at pages 683-684 where it is said, in treating with the there respondent's suggestion that public officers be divided into two classes, one of which should be designated "inferior officers": "We are unable to find any place where a line can reasonably be drawn so as to place some positions within and others outside the constitutional prohibition, and, in our opinion, there is no justification for excluding any public servants from its protection. The prohibition should therefore be read as applying to every state and local officer and employee. This construction is in accord with the basic purpose of safeguarding the public and its servants by forbidding oaths and declarations regarding matters that bear no reasonable relationship to governmental service and par-

ticularly those that involve political and religious beliefs. Persons in the lower levels of government are just as much entitled to this protection as those in higher positions. And other interpretation of the prohibition would lead to the absurd result that the relatively few persons who occupy the most important positions could be required to take only the constitutional oath, while those who work under them and execute their orders could be compelled to submit to various other oaths, declarations and tests." (Page 684.)

The Pockman case, at page 686, would seem to dispose of appellant's contention that the oath required here is a test of religious opinion where in dealing with such oath it is said that it ". . . is obviously not a test of religious opinion. Neither does it compel disavowal of any political belief or membership in any named political party. While it requires the affiant to swear that he does not advocate, or belong to any party or organization which advocates overthrow of the government by force or violence or other unlawful means, these may not properly be called matters of political opinion. The word 'political' imports orderly conduct of government, not revolution, and the term is not applicable to advocacy of a belief in overthrow of the government by force or violence."

In view of the concise holding in Pockman v. Leonard, supra, judgment is affirmed.

McMurray, *J. Pro tem.*

We concur:

Fox, *P.J.*

Ashburn, *J.*